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A New Revolution? The Italian Case 
 
JAMES L. NEWELL 
 
 
Introduction 
 
To establish the case that the recent riots and upheavals in Greece can potentially be seen 
as the prelude to a much broader uprising that could sweep Europe and threaten the 
current political order, requires showing two things. These are: (a) that the Greek events 
have counterparts in other countries and (b) that both sets of events – those in Greece and 
those elsewhere – threaten the current order. Addressing both these sets of issues in their 
entirety is more than is possible here but we can address part of the second set by looking 
at the significance of recent protest in Italy. Italy is one of Europe’s four largest countries 
in terms of population and GDP, alone accounting for 12 percent of the combined 
population of the 27 member states and 12 percent of the combined GDP. So it is 
unlikely that the Greek events have a wider and non-trivial significance unless it can be 
shown that among the other countries of the EU there are order-threatening events in Italy 
too.  
 
The most significant of recent waves of protest were ones that took place in 
October and November last year, just before the Greek events, following the publication 
of government proposals, which have since become law, for the reform of schools and 
universities. To assess the meaning and significance of the protest we begin by asking: 
Who was protesting and with what methods? Against what were they protesting? How 
many of them were there? What were the consequences? 
 
 
The anti-Gelmini protests 
 
The protests were mainly of school and university students, teachers and parents but 
included workers beyond the education sector. They were called the anti-Gelmini protests 
after the minister for education, Mariastella Gelmini, responsible for the proposals that 
provoked them. There were, in a range of major cities, a number of street demonstrations, 
involving occasional clashes with the police. There were also strikes and occupations of 
university buildings. The internet featured highly – as a forum for the exchange of ideas 
(through blogs and web sites); as an organisational tool (through the publication of 
information about forthcoming protests and the distribution of leaflets and other 
material), and as a space for the creation of a sense of community (for example by 
making possible the uploading of photographs and videos of protests through sites such 
as YouTube). None of the political parties had a very high profile in the protests. 
 
 The catalyst for the protests, the aforementioned education reforms, involved 
three main sets of measures. One concerned cuts in expenditure involving a reduction in 
staff numbers, which the Government sought to defend on the grounds of: the changing 
demography of the school and university sectors; Italy’s high level of public debt, and the 
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promise that a proportion of the savings would be re-allocated to the sector from 2010 in 
the form of new incentive payments for teachers. A second concerned procedural changes 
affecting universities, allowing them to become private foundations and introducing 
alterations to the procedures for the recruitment of staff, supposedly designed to increase 
the levels of meritocracy in the system. The third involved rules changes: marks for 
conduct as well as for academic achievement were to count in decisions about school 
students’ progression (supposedly to combat bullying); a kind of uniform (grembiule) 
was to be reintroduced in elementary schools (supposedly to eliminate social differences 
between pupils).        
 
 In terms of numbers involved, the biggest single set of protests probably took 
place on 30 October when the trade unions brought school and university staff out on 
strike and there were protest marches in several cities, with the one in Rome  involving  a 
million people according to the organisers. After this date the number of protests 
appeared to decline in size and frequency and the proposals that had given rise to them 
passed into law on 29 October as far as the schools were concerned and on 8 January as 
far as the universities were concerned. 
  
 
The social and cultural context 
 
That is as far as the bare facts go. In order to assess their significance we have to view 
them against the background of the social and cultural context in which they took place. 
From the present point of view the most salient features are threefold: first, the 
emergence and growth in recent years of what has been called the ‘new associationism’; 
that is, the growing number of non-governmental, voluntary and co-operative 
associations, which appears to be linked to a decline in the ideological and religious 
certainties of the Cold War period – of profound significance for Italian society as home 
to what was once the West’s largest communist party – together with changing patterns 
of consumption, bringing with them a growth in solidarity and loyalties outside the 
family.  
 
 In the second place, the apparent growth in civic commitment that seems to be 
implied by the new associationism has been accompanied by a growth in protest activity 
with – for example – the number of street demonstrations of various kinds rising from 
3,576 in 2000, to 7,022 in 2004 (Censis, 2005: 13). And there are very good reasons for 
viewing the two as parts of a single phenomenon, one of which is what Andrews (2005: 
7) refers to as the absence of a ‘sense of state’. Perpetuated by the conduct of the pre-
1994 governing parties, first, and by the populism of Berlusconi, second, such absence 
can be thought of as a cultural trait deriving from the encouragement of clientele 
practices rooted in familistic assumptions that sometimes spill over into instances of 
high-level corruption and collusion with criminal organisations. In such a context acts of 
civic engagement, or activity that in some way implies a commitment to the welfare of 
the collectivity, inevitably carry connotations of opposition to conventional politics and 
to the status quo. In the context of a Prime Minister seeking explicitly to use Parliament 
to pursue laws with no apparent purpose beyond the resolution of his private legal 
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difficulties, the activities tend – I would argue – to carry the very specific connotations of 
opposition to the government of the centre right. 
 
In the third place, it is possible to see the rise in protest activity as one indicator of 
the emergence, during what can be called ‘the Berlusconi years’, of a ‘new opposition’ 
whose centre of gravity is in the social movements rather than in political parties; whose 
most dramatic expression to date has been the Genova anti-capitalist protest in July 2001; 
whose adherents have been driven by themes of social justice, traditional to the left, but 
also by themes (such as defence of an independent media) that extend beyond it. It is a 
new opposition that challenges stereotypes about the role, in Italian society, of the 
Church – which was a focus for protests against the war in Iraq, given the Pope’s own 
opposition – and about the position of the South. According to the stereotypes, this is an 
area ‘characterised by a lack of civic commitment among [its inhabitants] who 
supposedly react passively to the influence which the Mafia exercises over the territory’ 
(Parini, 2000: 10). In recent years emergence of the new associationism has gone hand in 
hand with a seeming decline in power and influence of the Mafia and other organised 
crime groups. 
 
 
The significance of the anti-Gelmini protests 
 
Against this background, I believe rather firmly that the recent protests in Italy have not 
demonstrated the scale of the political crisis in Europe, if such there is, but are closer to 
representing a continuation of normal domestic politics. I have five reasons for believing 
this.  
 
In the first place there is, as I have already implied, nothing new about the recent 
protests: they are part of a general trend towards a growth in protest activity in general 
and, as any reasonably well-informed Italian citizen, reflecting back on the events of 
recent years will be able to recall, the period since Genova has seen other waves of 
protest as striking as those of October and November 2008. They include school-
students’ protests against another set of government-sponsored education reforms earlier 
in the decade. Then the protests gave rise to a movement called la Pantera (or ‘the 
Panther’) just as the more recent ones have been referred to as l’Onda (or ‘the Wave’) as 
if to convey the idea that there is some kind of organisational permanence underlying the 
protests, but which is in fact difficult to discern. They include the protests of the so-called 
Girotondi; the enormous demonstrations and strikes against government proposals to 
abolish article 18 of the Workers’ Statute; protests against the war in Afghanistan; the 
European Social Forum; the protests against the invasion of Iraq, with their rainbow-
coloured ‘peace flags’ hung from innumerable balconies up and down the country; the 
protests, in Val di Susa, against the proposed high-speed rail link between Lyon and 
Turin.  
 
In the second place, therefore, the October and November protests are – I would 
contend – part of the normal way in which politics is carried on in Italy. Although this is 
an assertion I find difficult to establish with solid evidence, I am very much of the 
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impression that street demonstrations, strikes and so on are a much more routine aspect of 
interaction between social and political actors in Italy than in, perhaps many, other West 
European countries. For example, with a highly institutionalised system of industrial 
relations, national strikes in this or that sector and even general strikes are established and 
accepted features of the periods that precede the conclusion of national-level pay 
agreements. Presumably, these forms of demonstration assist the processes of bargaining 
by providing peaceful confirmation to all concerned of exactly how much power can be 
wielded by each of the contracting parties. As rough and ready indicators of the normalcy 
of the recent education-reform protests, two features spring to mind. First, though they 
were succeeded by the Greek events very shortly afterwards, the latter do not appear to 
have done anything to prevent the Italian wave subsiding. Second, inserting the term 
‘onda’ into Google, in February, produced, as one of the first hits, a blog inviting its 
visitors to post answers to the question ‘What, in your opinion, has happened to ‘the 
wave’?’    
 
If one asks why protest activity appears to be a more routine form of political 
interaction in Italy than elsewhere, then due account has to be taken of the relative 
weakness of the authorities in that country. This is a long-standing feature of the Italian 
political system, one whose roots can be traced back at least as far as Unification itself, 
and it has a number of implications for protest. One is that if citizens’ lack confidence in 
the strength and impartiality of the gatekeepers to institutionalised channels of access to 
policy making, then they more likely to engage in protest than they would otherwise have 
been. Another is that the Italian authorities, under pressure to give proof of their ability 
effectively to remain sovereign within their territory have on several notable occasions in 
the post-war period managed protest rather repressively. However, perhaps because of 
the very same weakness, they have also historically been rather receptive to the 
substantive demands made by protestors. For example 
• 1969 and 1970, in the immediate aftermath of the workers’ and students’ protests, 
saw 
o improvements to the pensions system,  
o the passage of the so-called Workers’ Statute (which among other things 
established the right of workers to meet and organise at their place of work),  
o the introduction of divorce and the legislation necessary to give effect to the 
constitutional provisions providing  
o for the establishment of decentralised (i.e. regional) government and  
o for abrogative referenda. 
• In 1976, the movement for urban renewal was successful in obtaining passage of law 
no. 278. This increased the opportunities for popular participation in local decision-
making by providing for the election of decentralised, neighbourhood councils in 
municipalities of over 30,000 inhabitants. 
• In the course of the 1980s, a large number of the social circles set up in the wake of 
the youth movement of 1977 gained official recognition as associations able to fill a 
number of the gaps in the provisions of the welfare state. A number of the circles 
even received public subsidies (della Porta, 1996: 47, 79, 82). 
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My point, quite simply, is that protest activity is more likely to be resorted to, and 
therefore the more likely to be a routine feature of political interaction, the more 
successful it is.  
 
 In the third place, a not insignificant feature of the October and November 
demonstrations was the absence of any kind of high-profile alliance between the 
protesters themselves and any significant party-political actors. On the contrary, as a 
journalist seeking to provide a sketch of the outlooks of the students noted,  
 
Of Italian politicians there is not a single mention. [There is] opposition to the 
centre right and diffidence towards Veltroni and the Pd (Portanova, Riva and 
Schiavulli, 2008: 79). 
 
…that is, the Democratic Party, the main party of the centre left. In this respect, the 
demonstrations seem to have reflected the earlier protests I mentioned in that like them, 
they too have challenged the authority of the centre-left parties. As one student declared: 
‘Let them not try again to take charge of the protest; it won’t be accepted’ (e non provino 
ancora a metterci il cappello sopra, non passa) (Portanova, Riva and Schiavulli, 2008: 
79). This reflects a very strong anti-political element in the protest movement, anti-
political attitudes having acquired growing salience generally in Italian political culture 
in recent years. By anti-political attitudes I mean attitudes that involve a rejection of 
conventional political activities, politicians and parties – typically in ways that allow no 
appeal: either established politicians’ competition masks more fundamental collusion 
between them, denying the people any real choice, or else political competition prevents 
the resolution of the people’s problems by placing an obstacle in the way of a sense of 
common purpose. Filippo Andreatta, Professor of International Relations at the 
University of Bologna, summed up the anti-political mood well. When asked whether he 
thought the anxieties expressed by the student protestors were closer to being existential 
or political, he replied: 
 
I would say a pre-political anxiety. I see in it the lack of any hope rather than a 
political objective. Unlike in 1968, the protest has not been ignited by any 
ideology. It is directed against the political class as a whole, which is not seen as 
representative of the country at large ((Portanova, Riva and Schiavulli, 2008: 75). 
 
The significance of this is that a movement that goes beyond a certain point in rejecting 
politics must, surely, weaken itself by undermining its ability itself to act politically. 
 
The fourth reason why I would downplay the significance of the recent protests 
for the prospects of radical change is that they came at a time when it was reasonable to 
expect an upsurge in protest activity anyway, this as a result of last year’s general 
election. This resulted in the exclusion from Parliament, for the first time since the war, 
of any representatives of the socialist or communist left (as a result of a combination of 
the electoral law and popular disappointment with the performance of the outgoing 
centre-left government under Romano Prodi). Unless the centre-left parties that did win 
seats could themselves represent the concerns of the supporters of the excluded parties, 
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then it was reasonable to anticipate that frustrations would be expressed through non-
institutional, protest activity – which after all represents a channel of influence to which 
groups are obliged to have recourse when they cannot influence policy through 
institutional channels such as parties. Unfortunately, the main party of the centre left, the 
Pd, did not look well placed to take on the task of representing supporters of the radical 
left since its leader had decided, since before the election, to adopt a notably restrained 
and moderate stance on most things as part of his strategy of seeking to expand his 
party’s electoral base towards the centre of the political spectrum. 
 
A final reason why I would downplay the significance of the recent protests for 
the prospects of radical change is that, even if the protesters had established links with 
significant party-political actors, the actors most sympathetic to their cause – the parties 
of the radical left expelled from Parliament – would not, precisely because of that 
expulsion, have been in a state to act as any kind of effective spearhead for the protesters. 
The election outcome meant that they suffered a heavy financial setback – as the system 
of public funding of parties ties the amounts available directly to vote shares – which in 
turn meant that they suffered a significant organisational setback; for public funding 
largely compensates for the difficulties the parties have – as revealed, for example, by 
long-term membership decline – in maintaining themselves through their own efforts 
(Newell, 2009). Added to which were the obstacles to their acting as effective protest 
vehicles created by the deep disagreements emerging at their election post-mortem 
conferences in the summer of 2008. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
What I conclude, contemplating the issues I have discussed, are two things. First, 
assessing the significance of something like protest in Italy confirms for me the 
importance of adopting interpretive approaches to the analysis of other societies. Too 
often in the study of other countries researchers make mistakes in their assessments of the 
significance of events because they fail to adopt methods and methodologies – generally 
qualitative – embodying sensitivity to the meanings that actors themselves attach to their 
actions. Rather, they adopt quantitative, survey-based and comparative approaches, 
imposing their own frameworks of understanding on the reality that they seek to study – 
with the result that ‘the characteristics attributed to [the] foreign culture….[differ little] 
from the folklore or prejudices about the foreign country which already exist in [their] 
own society’ (Scheuch, 1967, quoted by Dogan and Pelassy, 1990: 70). A street 
demonstration in Italy does not have the same meaning as an apparently similar event in 
the UK or elsewhere – so the mere fact we have events that can seemingly be measured 
and quantified in the same terms between two or more societies, does not mean that we 
can draw the same inferences from them when it comes to conclusions about their 
significance for some general, cross-national trend. 
 
Second, there exists a very simple test that we can apply to assess the significance 
for radical or revolutionary change of a group or movement and it is known as Michael 
Mann’s IOTA model. In Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class, 
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Mann sets out four conditions that have to be fulfilled if classes are to exist as 
compartmentalised social collectives cemented by a shared sense of group consciousness. 
These conditions can used to assess the potential of any group to overturn the political 
order. First, a shared ‘identity’ must exist between the group’s members. Second, this 
identity must include a perception of ‘opposition’ to other group interests. Third, these 
components must combine in a ‘totality’ that defines the group members’ social situation 
and society in general. Fourth, an ‘alternative’ to the existing power relations must be 
conceived. From what I can see, the recent protest movement in Italy has managed only 
the first two conditions – and then but partially. The third and forth have never come 
anywhere near to being fulfilled. Therefore, I am not persuaded that, in any meaningful 
sense of the term, there is, at the moment, any real potential for radical political change 
here. 
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